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Abstract: Between July 8th and 11th, 2016 an intense fighting erupted in South 
Sudan. This was the second instance to the previous fighting that broke-out between 
December 15th and 18th, 2013 and both happened in Juba the capital city of the 
country. These revealed that, South Sudan was not only the newest nation in the 
world, but also but also the youngest nation facing many dilemmas in forging for 
national identity and consolidating peace. These incidences require scholars to be 
sober and surpass the oversimplifications of the causes of this mayhem.  Thus, 
understanding these challenges calls for re-considering and re-framing the 
understanding of the real enemy, to forge a healthy national identity that the 
country needs. In this journey, I challenge South Sudanese to re-think reflectively 
and critically if they are to understand the manifestation of the postcolonial–neo-
colonial image of imperialism that have not allowed meaningful transition and state 
building and unlearn the perceived misunderstanding, and invitation is for them to 
embrace roles of democracy, nationhood, and governance in peace and nation 
building. As this paper advances, it is by embracing such reconsiderations that 
nation building, and the identity formation among South Sudanese, the prospects 
newly country of South Sudan will be possible.  
 




Three days before the commemoration and celebration of the fifth 
anniversary of their Independence Day, South Sudanese were plunged into 
intense fighting that lasted for three days, from 8 to 11 of July, 2016. 
Different from the December 2013 fierce civil violence incident, the first after 
the independence of South Sudan; this time civilians were killed in front of 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) forces, 
who were charged by the UN with the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians 
(Mamdani, 2017a). December 2013 fighting erupted following collapse of 
the new government signified by the dismissal of the Vice-President and 
other high-ranking officials; the July 2016 fighting that erupted on his return 
to Juba with more than 1,200 armed fighters which was perceived as an 
essential starting point for the implementation of the peace agreement 
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(UNMISS, 2016; AUCISS, 2014; Mamdani, 2014). This return and its 
aftermath in particular was a challenge to the African Union’s efforts for the 
implementation of African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan 
(AUCISS) report recommendations and the concluded peace deal between 
the two major warring parties in 2015. It testified to the validity of one of the 
commonly held political positions that “Dinka without Kiir will not settle; 
Nuer without Machar will not settle; and yet, the two will not work 
together” (Mamdani, 2014: 53). In a way, the “ongoing conflict is a 
manifestation of several aspects of the poor implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), as well as historical power and 
resource conflicts between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups and the 
weakness of mechanistic approaches to peace” (Masabo, 2014). In addition, 
it echoes Masabo (2013: 149) observation, that “separation without 
addressing the root causes of the conflicts is not panacea to ensuring 
sustainable peace” in South Sudan. 
 
In this article, I invite South Sudanese to re-consider more processes that are 
inclusive, which are mindful of the fact that, there are multiple sources of 
authority and thus constant and dynamic competition and struggles for 
recognition (Lund, 2016). This is key for a better new South Sudan since, 
and as other scholars have remarked, “‘the situation in South Sudan is not 
just another African war’. This is a test of a new state and nation-building 
concepts. Mediation and peace building that undermine the work done to 
date will simply cement the crisis” (Le Riche, 2014a). This is so because “this 
crisis is beyond anything we have seen in scale, magnitude and depth. A 
quick fix power-sharing agreement will not work – problems of the country 
and leadership are too deep. [She repeated, for emphasis], ‘we need to re-
boot South Sudan – no quick fix, no deal, will do it’” (Mamdani, 2014: 53).  
 
The latter emphasis was similar to Le Riche’s (2014a) observation as well as 
to what Mamdani observed in his 2016 lecture, ‘South Sudan: The Road to 
Civil War’, that “It’s unfair to call South Sudan a failed state, because the 
political foundation for the existence of a state has yet to be forged in South 
Sudan” (Hawkins, 2016). Thus, “it needs a second transition, this time under 
an authority other than the United States, Britain and Norway, whose 
project has failed, or IGAD, whose members have conflicting interests in 
South Sudan” (Mamdani, 2017a: 11). As such, one can argue that the 
separation of Sudan into Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan in 
July 2011, following the secession referendum and ultimate independence 
for southerners opened a new chapter in the South Sudan that goes beyond 
the perceived problem (Masabo, 2013). It partly calls South Sudanese to re-
address and rethink anew if their hard-won independence is to reflect what 
they long fought for particularly the access to resources and recognition.  
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This article revolves around the imperative for appreciating diversities as a 
basis for forging a better future in South Sudan. I tease South Sudanese 
understanding of how capitalist mechanisms have been manifesting 
themselves in the postcolonial or the neo-colonial in Africa. In addition, I 
pursued them to unlearn the perceived misunderstanding of the problems 
by gauging how to transform themselves from a long history of warring as 
survival mechanisms to embrace democracy, new nationhood, and 
governance as alternatives of wars, guns, bullets in the course of statecraft. 
 
In that regard, in this article, I concentrates on the conflicting dynamics of 
South Sudan since 2011 and more particularly the December 2013 civil 
plight and developments after December 2013 fighting. I focus on African 
Union’s initiatives in response to the South Sudan crisis. I pay particular 
with attention decisions reached by the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union (AU), during its 411th meeting held at the level of Heads of 
State and Government, in Banjul, The Gambia, on 30 December 2013, which 
mandated the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan 
(AUCISS).  
 
One of these developments is the collapse of the peace deal between 
President Kiir and his vice President Machar that reinstated him and called 
for his and assuming his executive duties which were revoked from him in 
April 2013. These, will serve as the conceptual foundation in explaining 
peace dilemmas and national building trajectories in South Sudan, which is 
frequently experiencing a series of civil revolts that has been going on in the 
country since its founding day. In this particle also, I discuss the dilemma of 
secession and missed opportunities on the one hand, and challenges and 
prospects for peace consolidation in the South Sudan on the other. It is my 
hope that, by discussing missed peace opportunities, and proposing a way 
forward; I will contributing to this noble endeavour for peace in South 
Sudan.   
 
After this introduction, I structure the rest of the article as follows: the 
second part provides an account on how scholars have approached South 
Sudanese peace, and how this article approaches it immediately follows. 
Within this part, I present various scholarly views of South Sudan peace, 
and thereafter the theoretical lens that this article employs for 
understanding the conflicts and peace building in processes. The third part 
addresses the dilemmas and missed opportunities. Fourth part that is 
devoted to discussing challenges as well as the prospects for peace 
consolidation in South Sudan follows and finally the conclusion. 
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Approaching the South Sudan Peace Processes 
South Sudan and the challenge of change 
Founding of South Sudan almost fifty years after the African phase of 
decolonization, has not made it a unique case. Just like many other African 
countries, it has not managed to avoid what characterizes most of African 
countries: the imported state, or state formation preceding nation creation. 
Banking on Ndlovu-Gatshen (2013: 24), what is going on in South Sudan 
like many other postcolonial African states reveals the “negative 
manifestation of sovereignty normally ascribed by other states rather than 
positive sovereignty rooted inside and manifested in effective control and 
popular acceptability.” Thus, if the state has preceded the nation then, the 
South Sudanese do not only need to overcome this inherent African 
phenomenon; but also, to build a nation out of fifty years of war, as well as 
address the common façade of the inherited state.  
 
For a number of scholars (e.g. AUCISS, 2014; Johnson, 2014; Le Riche, 2014a; 
Mamdani 2017a; Masabo, 2014; 2013), what is happening in South Sudan 
reveals the internal weaknesses of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). That is to say, by excluding political, civil and women 
groups, and strengthening the armed dictators in the north and introducing 
one in the South, the 2005 CPA saw the seeds of retardation are inhibiting 
progress in South Sudan (Mamdani, 2017a). It set a bad beginning with a 
militaristic assumption that; only those who waged war should determine 
the terms of the peace. The talks excluded political and civic groups, 
strengthening the armed dictatorship in the North, and introducing one in 
the South (Mamdani, 2017a: 11). In this way, I argue (2014), South Sudanese 
are confronted to mirror the extent to which the their peace processes have 
been so rationalised that, the emotional and affective part of it sometimes 
gets drowned in rational and idealistic concepts, good only for the 
classroom and often inefficient in the field. Moreover, they need to 
understand that warriors alone will not bring them long-lasting peace, and 
that any future peace talks need to consider the proper involvement of the 
various groups of people and various approaches such as feminist 
approaches, have to peace. As experience has taught us, “while most men 
come to the negotiating table directly from the war room and battlefield, 
women usually arrive straight from civil activism” (Masabo, 2014). As such, 
it is vital to recognise that, in South Sudan, “the very political and 
institutional foundation for the existence of a state—as a political process 
that legitimates a sovereign power, and the creation of an administrative, 
technical and legal infrastructure as the means for exercising that power — 
has yet to be forged” (Mamdani, 2017a: 11).   
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Studies on South Sudan peace process: a synopsis   
Several scholars have written on South Sudan conflicts, and suggested 
solutions to solve the problems of peace building. From their analysis, there 
are two groups or types of factors suggesting causes for conflicts. The first 
group of factors is from the theorists and scholars, who assert that, the 
problem of South Sudan has gone far beyond local boundaries, and that its 
solution needs national and international efforts. These are scholars like 
Copnall (2014) and Johnson (2011). This study supports this assertion, and 
agrees that, of course, when one talks about the conflicts of Dinka and Nuer 
in the context of South Sudan, which goes further to include disputes on the 
nature of CPA, international solution are indispensable. However, when 
one thinks about the relationship between the two ethnic groups, referring 
to things shared in common in our case political power and access to 
resources, here the traditional approaches are more appropriate to 
international and mechanistic approaches (Masabo, 2014). 
 
The second group of factors is from theorists and scholars, who contend 
that, there are traditional measures based on people’s culture that are still 
useful to solve the contemporary conflicts. Within this are by scholars like 
Sansculotte-Greenidge and Tsuma (2011), Sansculotte-Greenidge (2011), 
Hagg & Kagwanja (2007), and Osman (2007). In the same line of thinking, 
this study supports the need to apply traditional cultural approaches. 
 
However, in differentiating itself from the existing line of scholarship, the 
study calls for reconsidering democracy, citizenship, and governance as key 
areas within which South Sudan can overcome the challenges it is facing. 
Given this scenario, one can suggest then, that, the end of the conflict 
between Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan has nothing to do 
with conflict between these two tribes. As many have argued, the conflicts 
between Dinka and Nuer are older than the former, and factors or sources 
of conflict apparently differ. Competition for resources is necessary for 
livelihood for the two tribes, but unfortunately, this is not the case for the 
two nations (Republics of Sudan and South Sudan). Therefore, specific 
solutions for Dinka-Nuer have to come mainly from within the two ethnic 
groups, and less from outside. Furthermore, other issues such as the 
military-civilian based conflict, state-people (ordinary citizens) based 
conflicts ought to have the right path to their address. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to other ethnic groups in South Sudan, like Shuiulk, Equatorian 
similar logic follows soot that: solving of conflicts among ethnic groups is 
the first as it is the basis for enhancing national cohesion.  
 
Cementing on the relevance of culture to maintain peace, Mckay (2009: 235) 
asserts that, since 1956 for instance, there have been several civil wars 
between tribes allied with northern Sudan and those allied with South 
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Sudan. Although the Dinka tribe’s men maintained influence for the 50 
years’ war against the former North Sudan, the role of Nuer was also 
significant in the struggle against North. To overcome this, Hagg & 
Kagwanja (2007: 25), call for the acknowledgment of the role of regional 
peace and security mechanisms in conflict resolution, as well as the use of 
traditional justice mechanism in conflict resolution, especially in the context 
of increasing state failure on the continent. They further caution against the 
enthusiastic embrace of international justice mechanisms that may 
sometimes create obstacles to peace and reconciliation.  
 
Additionally, they stress that, since ‘war begins in the mind’; peace too 
ought to begin from the mind. This entails conflict transformation that seeks 
to broaden perceptions and social relations, by creating historical 
awareness, and destroying myths upon which adversary identities rests. 
Understanding culture and cultural diversity is an important key to 
unlocking and understanding complex human nature. Many earlier and 
more recent expeditions and studies point to the existence of a rich oral 
culture, and resilience and creativity amongst the people. However, as 
colonialism took root in the country as in most countries on continent, one 
of the earliest casualties was this noble institution; culture (see Osman, 2007: 
125), Dinka and Nuer’s culture being amongst the casualties.  But as Jinadu 
(2000: 3) attests, their culture must be viewed from the more positive and 
more embracing perspective of creating and enabling an environment for 
self-realization and for the enjoyment and sustenance of self-development.  
 
Theoretical framework  
In the course of understanding the nature and dynamics of conflicts, 
theorists have developed several theories that capture some or most of the 
major preoccupations of the phenomena. This study utilizes the theoretical 
formulation of Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman and Eric C. Marcus—the 
Cooperative Theory as refined in 2006.   
 
Cooperative theory has two basic ideas: one relates to the type of 
interdependence among goals of the people involved in a given situation; 
and the other pertains to the type of action taken by the people involved. In 
addition to that, the theory postulates two basic types of interdependence 
goal correlations, positive and negative interdependence. Positive 
interdependence correlation occurs when goals are linked in such a way 
that the amount or probability of a person’s goal attainment is positively 
correlated with the amount or probability of another obtaining his/her 
goals. However, in negative interdependence correlation the goals are 
linked in such a way that the probability of goal attainment is negatively 
correlated with the amount of probability of the other’s goal attainment.  As 
Deutsch et al. (2006: 24) simply puts it; “if you are positively linked with 
another, then you sink or swim together and with negative linkage, if other 
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sinks you swim and if the other swims you sink.” Thus, positive 
interdependence can result from people linking to one another, and 
rewarded in terms of their joint achievements. Similarly, with regard to 
negative interdependence, it can result from people delinking from one 
another or from their being rewarded in such a way that the more other gets 
of the reward, the less another gets, and so on. In addition to positive and 
negative interdependence, it is as well necessary to recognize that, there can 
be a lack of interdependence or independence, such that the activities and 
fate of the people involved do not affect one another directly or indirectly. If 
they are completely independent of one another, no conflict arises; the 
existence of a conflict implies some form of interdependence (Deutsch et al., 
2006: 25). Further to that, Deutsch et al., (2006) also highlights two basic 
types of action by an individual: ‘effective actions’, which improve the 
actors’ chances of obtaining a goal and ‘bungling actions’, which worsen the 
actors’ chance of obtaining the goal.  
 
Using the above theoretical framework, then the conflicts between Dinka 
and Nuer have a positive interdependence. The history shows that, over 
time, these two tribes have been able to share their struggles, and, in fact, 
their goal was to swim together. Positive interdependence is clear, which 
informs that, effective action can easily work. In addition, both Dinka and 
Nuer share the country, but with slight difference shares of political 
positions. That is to say, although South Sudan President Kiir is Dinka, 
Machar a Nuer has been a leading figure of this second major ethnic group 
in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLM/A) politics for years. Therefore, it is in this context that, I 
advocate for amicable and horizontal conflict resolution mechanisms which 
will embracing modernity without discarding the culture of co-existence, 
addressing the quest for national building, and forging true national 
identity needed in this newly country as the one of the most valid and 
reliable approaches to solving the conflicts South Sudan.  
 
Along with the Cooperative theory, the study adopts the Institute for 
Economics and Peace (IEP) (2013), ‘Pillars of Peace Framework’ as an 
auxiliary theoretical lens to help in understanding the process of peace 
consolidation in South Sudan. This framework identifies the national 
characteristics, which are most closely associated with peace, and have been 
derived from a process of statistical analysis (IEP, 2013: 1). Pillars of peace 
framework approaches peace by emphasising on the need for 
understanding and describing the factors that create peaceful societies. In 
that regard, pillars of peace framework is best suited to understanding the 
dynamics and challenges facing the peace consolidation in South Sudan.  
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Dilemma of secession and missed opportunities  
December 2013 and July 2016 contain two sad events in the country’s 
memory, such that South Sudanese are challenged to reflect upon as they 
forge ahead and they proceed to their forthcoming anniversaries of 
statehood. They signified that, the road to statehood and national building 
in South Sudan was premised on the wrong assumption. Assured of 
unconditional international support, South Sudan’s rulers acted with 
impunity, while strategies to establish healthy future for all South Sudanese 
were not entertained. More seriously, the resolutions to create an all-party 
transitional government of national unity, to hold a constitutional 
conference and an election within two years were ignored after 
independence in 2011. Moreover, as many scholars have argued, it seems 
that there is no consensus on how to move forward (see Mamdani, 2017a: 8).  
 
It is probably because of this, that one of the terms of reference given to the 
AUCISS the AUPSC, Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (CDXI) dated 
December 31 2013 directly instructed the commissioners “to investigate the 
causes underlying the violations” (AUCISS, 2014: 8). According to 
Mamdani’s (2014) AUCISS separate opinion (report), the explanation to 
such term of reference is that, the underlying causes for ongoing violation in 
South Sudan is a “conundrum” of apparition of the perceived enemy. 
Taking it further Mamdani, (2017a: 11), argue that,  the troika (the United 
States, Britain, and Norway also often known as Friends of IGAD [Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development, the regional bloc]) were 
convinced that the main threat to peace after independence would come 
from the north, the troika pushed for a hasty transition, bypassing 
democratic reform. Here under are two examples of the dilemma and 
missed opportunities. 
 
Dilemma of secession 
Secession in the CPA was a last resort if the possibility of the new Sudan 
was impossible. However, it became the only issue, that, both the South 
Sudanese, IGAD and the troika—Friends of IGAD were interested in.  “The 
demise of the enthusiasm to Sudan reform agenda: struggling for the ‘New 
Sudan’” (Masabo, 2013: 147) as primary agenda to CPA, opened an era of 
strong emphasis on secession as the only solution to the prevailing problem. 
As Iyekolo (2011: 54-56) puts it, “events in the post-Garang era saw the re-
awakening of self-determination clause that was meant to be a last resort 
should unity be impossible to attain. [In its aftermath] ... the quest for 
independence then became the main vision and driving force of SPLM/A 
commitment to the CPA implementation under a façade of sometimes 
‘untenable excuses’ as well as tacit and indifferent posture with a final aim 
of secession in view.”  Thus instead of reforming Sudan; separation was 
preferred and other critical issues such as of contested or the three 
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transitional areas (TTA): Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were 
ignored or less attended to (Masabo, 2013). In that regard, the declaration of 
the independence of the Republic of South Sudanese manifested that: “The 
CPA’s national reform agenda has been largely ignored, although this was 
the very underlying comprehensive claim of the CPA” (Institute of Security 
Studies (ISS) 2009: 10). 
 
Thus, with the secession, basic challenges of peace building became evident, 
as the often-framed archenemy framed Khartoum perceived for quite long 
as almost the only problem, could no more provide the benchmark for 
unity. The opening of internal realities that followed the secession revealed 
how South Sudanese misperceived the problems of their nation. It became 
apparent that the challenge for peace building in South Sudan lied within 
the perception formed by South Sudanese who framed their country’s 
problems (Sudan before separation of South Sudan) and embraced images 
of the North (present Republic of Sudan) as the only enemy. This led to the 
limited nationalist struggles, which took struggle for self-determination to 
mean secession. They seemed to have not realised that the major challenges 
were the crisis of the colonial legacy, particularly recognition (citizenship) 
and access to property.  
 
As the result, how to approach national building and identity formation 
amongst South Sudanese which was key to the prospects of the new 
country-the Republic of South Sudan escaped their imagination. Because of 
that, governance rooted in the country’s multiple diversities that could have 
been the only guarantee for South Sudan’s unity and viability could not take 
root. However, when addressing the challenges and consequences of 
southern Sudan’s secession, it is important to focus on the future rather than 
on the past (Nyaba, 2014: x). In that respect, if South Sudanese is to reap 
from its fifty years efforts, it has to devise a means to overcome the triple 
challenges. This may be by embracing modernity without discarding the 
culture of co-existence; addressing the quest for national building by 
putting in place structures work governance systems; and forging of 
appropriate true and needed South Sudanese identity by politics of 
inclusion and co-existence.   
 
Ongoing South Sudan fighting:  civil war or ethnic cleansing?  
The collapse of government of South Sudan in 2013 following Kiir’s 
dismissal of the cabinet members, beginning with the vice President Riek 
Machar, has been explained different by different scholars (De Vries and 
Schomerus, 2017; Gosztonyi, 2016; Krause, 2019; Nyadera, 2018; Owiso, 
2018).  However, many may agree with Johnson’s (2014: 300) analysis that 
“despite the fact that the arrested ministers came from a variety of 
communities across South Sudan, Western media reports cast the political 
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struggle exclusively in tribal terms, of Salva Kiir’s Dinka against Riek 
Machar’s Nuer. The targeted killings in Juba and revenge killings … in 
Akobo and Bor in Jonglei state seemed to bear this out.” Put differently and 
capturing Mamdani (2016) ‘Who’s to Blame in South Sudan’ piece 
appearing in the Boston review, Hawkins (2016) argue that: 
 
…the outbreak of violence in South Sudan in 2013 was 
accompanied by various political motivations. One, 
identified by Mamdani, was the motivation of the South 
Sudanese political leadership to separate society into “us vs. 
them.” This strategy, he argued, turned the crisis from 
political to ethnic. While it had been common for 
neighboring tribes to fight over resources in the past, these 
tensions were exacerbated by external influences that 
emphasized tribalism over common culture (Hawkins, 2016). 
 
With this note, making sense of the situation unfolding in South Sudan is a 
daunting task since “most commentary on the situation mirrors most of 
which has come before regarding conflict in Africa more generally” (Le 
Riche, (2014a). Nevertheless, as Johnson (2014) and Mamdani (2016) 
observe, the collapse of national building project is transforming it from 
political violence into a civil war and ethnic conflict between the Dinka and 
Nuer. This was a proof that unique “context was largely overlooked during 
South Sudan’s crucial interim period and after independence” (Mamdani, 
2014: 54).  
 
Missed peace opportunities 
Peace is one of the major opportunities missed by South Sudanese people. 
Peace if viewed through the lens of both negative and positive peace 
(Galtung, 1964; Galtung and Fischer, 2013). Negative peace which is the 
absence of violence, or fear of violence (used as the definition of peace to 
create the Global Peace Index [GPI]); while positive peace may be defined as 
the attitudes, institutions and structures that, when strengthened, lead to a 
more peaceful society (IEP, 2013: 1). It is in the latter sense that ought to be 
in South Sudan’s case and which is likely to be attained by employing the 
‘Pillars of peace framework’. The utility of this framework emanates from 
the general trend in peace and conflict scholarship, which has revealed 
limited research investigating the underlying causes of peace. Many studies 
have focused on understanding, factors which are commonly associated 
with conflicts. As such  
 
[Pillars of peace framework] …provides a framework for 
assessing the positive peace factors that create peaceful 
societies. The taxonomy also forms an ideal base for 
measuring a society’s potential for peace. This is an eight-
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part taxonomy consists of: a well-functioning government; a 
sound business environment; an equitable distribution of 
resources; an acceptance of the rights of others; good 
relations with neighbours; free flow of information; a high 
level of human capital; and low levels of corruption. These 
eight pillars were found to be associated with peaceful 
environments and are both inter-dependent and mutually 
reinforcing, such that improvements in one factor would 
tend to strengthen others and vice versa. Therefore, the 
relative strength of any one Pillar has the potential to 
positively or negatively influence the others, thereby 
influencing peace (IEP, 2013: 1-2). 
 
It is true that, if put within this framework or if South Sudan could have 
embraced such an approach; continued internal crises could have given way 
to peace and to the ultimate goals of peace building and national 
development. However, this seems to have not been the case. To forge 
ahead in the search for peace, the first proposal is for the government of 
South Sudan and its people to work towards a consensus, and not a 
compromise and see how they can re-work, and repair their road map 
towards better peaceful co-existence. Secondly is that “the ruling political 
elite in South Sudan must change their modus operandi if South Sudan is not 
to slide back into conflicts and anarchy” (Nyaba 2014: x). The eight pillars of 
the proposed approach can as well summarize what was missing within the 
thinking of many South Sudanese military-political elites who have thought 
to address their misunderstanding wrongly-by the use of guns! While many 
can rebuke the so-called rebels; the fact remains that, the work done in the 
South Sudan by the incumbent, has to large extent stimulated what has 
happened. Since this is not the subject intended to be addressed in this 
article; the next parts concentrate on analyzing the triple challenges to South 
Sudan peace and link them to Pillars of Peace Framework as the solution 
where possible.  
 
Challenges and prospects for peace consolidation in South Sudan 
Some of the terms of reference given to the AUCISS commissioners on their 
appointment to the commission, were “to make recommendations on the 
best ways, and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing 
among all South Sudanese communities with a view to deterring and 
preventing the occurrence of the violations in future, and to make 
recommendations on how to move the country forward in terms of unity, 
cooperation, and sustainable development” (AUCISS, 2014: 8). In fulfilling 
these tasks associated with these terms however, an observation was 
supposed to be made, that, “South Sudan is not a failed state but a failed 
transition. It needs a second transition, this time under an authority other 
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than the former one whose approach was of one-size-fits-all (Mamdani, 
2017a: 11).  
 
Moreover, though the July 2016 fights erupted while implementing the 
peace deal between Machar and Kiir South Sudanese should not despair. 
Instead, we have to work to help South Sudan to overcome its statecraft 
challenges. As observed by Johnson (2014: 309), “there is potential for 
opening up space for other voices to be heard and other groups to be 
involved in resolving the underlying issues that led to conflict.” In 
responding to this observation and contributing towards Sudan’s second 
transition, I propose hereunder three issues or areas to be considered by 
South Sudanese as they forge ahead to make their country reflect what they 
fought for.  
 
Embracing modernity: human rights and democracy in South 
Sudan 
Eruption of intense fighting in December 2013 and July 2016 in Juba, in a 
period of five years after its independence was one of the signs that roots for 
respect of human rights and promotion of democracy and democratic 
leadership have not taken roots in South Sudan. It was an indication that, 
unless people are listened to, involved, included, their rights respected, and 
protected; Africa will never graduate from violence. That is to say, as a 
continent, Africa seems to be de-democratising.  
 
Instead of popular empowerment, participation, competition, and 
legitimacy, the democratisation process in South Sudan seems to result into 
feelings of dispossession and growing alienation amongst the people. To 
South Sudanese leadership in n in particular, these wars were signs of of 
immaturity to both sides: the incumbent and the sucked vice president 
because of three reasons. One, they failed to learn from history that, on the 
one hand, it was because of the perceived oppressions of the North, which 
forced the southerners to take up arms and launch the liberation movement 
for self-determination.  
 
As such, they quickly forget that even with fifty years of war, South Sudan’s 
independence finally came through peaceful negotiation envisaged by the 
CPA. Two, it seems that they have not Secondly, they did not understood 
what made them to experience internal differences soon after secession 
which were formally were absorbed by their perceived enemy. In addition, 
they seem not to acknowledge that the challenge of competing or struggles 
for recognition and access to resources could not be avoided, but only lived-
with and solved inclusive politics and not by the bullets. Had they have 
embraced Garang’s roadmap for reforming Sudan (Masabo, 2013; 
Zambakari 2015), it could have helped to bind them together as people of 
South Sudan. And thirdly, they did not capture the real picture that what 
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was happening was a clear sign that the problem was not only the North, 
but the specter of decolonization, poor governance, lack of development 
and the continued forces of imperialism that were feeding on the lucrative 
resources of the underdeveloped and South Sudan respectively.  
 
To overcome all these some scholars (Owiso, 2018; Radon and Logan 2014) 
are calling South Sudanese to rebuild their country under the principles of 
modern statecraft, which put at the centre respect and promotion of human 
rights, democracy and democratic leadership. However, the question that 
such proposal leaves unanswered is how South Sudanese should go about 
it. This is so because it is not a new call and not a novel arrangement 
different from those that were anticipated the CPA almost fifteen years ago. 
Nevertheless, others too, have not been tired in responding to the how 
question. Scholars such as (Awolich, 2018; De Vries and Schomerus, 2017; 
Krause, 2019; Nyadera, 2018; Owiso, 2018; Zambakari, 2015) have 
responded to this question, and attempted to show how South Sudanese can 
go about in embracing human rights, democracy and democratic leadership. 
Two approaches from these scholars standout in providing implementable 
solutions to South Sudan. The first focus on the “the establishment of an 
inclusive framework to manage diverse populations within a unified 
nation” (Zambakari, 2015), and the second focuses on the establishment 
“transitional authority that will help deconstruct the myth that ethnicity is 
the basis of survival and instead suggests the establishment of a 
government” (Nyadera, 2018: 60-61). Although they are implementable 
proposals, they are nevertheless not easy ones, as they may seem since they 
touch the core issues that have characterised the politics that have been 
constraining peace and national building in South Sudan. They invite South 
Sudanese to shifting from their focus on ethnic groups and embrace the 
whole nation in organising their polity as one of the necessary pathways for 
greater good for all.  
 
Within these proposals, leaders’ self–criticism and realisation that peace in 
South Sudan is beyond Dinka and Nuer, and that nation building strategies 
ought to move beyond Dinka-Nuer binary by providing strategic direction 
and vision that all South Sudanese can rally around regardless of their 
differences in ethnic origin. Once such acknowledgement and self-
evaluation is made, Zambakari (2015:71) then challenges them that given 
their diversities in terms of languages and nationalities (ethnic groups), 
“they must build a more inclusive political community that upholds unity 
in diversity, maintains the rule of law, and practices democracy in 
governance.” If this is to be realised, many of the issues that have been 
haunting South Sudan will be solved amicably and peacefully. Nonetheless, 
going incidences after independence particularly those of 2013 and 2016 that 
claimed people’s lives and property, signs of respect human rights and 
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promotion of democracy and democratic leadership seem to have not roots 
in South Sudan. It is even frustrating when we the very independence that 
people have been fighting for long, becomes a reawakening moment for old 
conflicts, and exacerbating created new ones.  
 
This have anticipated neither by the 2005 CPA negotiators nor by those 
coming to power cession referendum. Surprisingly even the newly military-
political elite seem not to care about it and issues of national building under 
the template of modern statecraft receives only lip service. Its top priority 
has been to constitute itself as a military aristocracy through various 
predation strategies (some dating the days of war) that are keen to favour 
expansion of its own kinship network (Pinand, 2014: 193) without regarding 
other groups, all who are part of the nation. This is contra to the words from 
the July 2011 South Sudan Independence speech that President Salva Kiir 
made in which he affirmed the imperative of the government that is 
democratic, inclusive and accountable as a critical foundation for the future 
of the South Sudanese and as a guarantor for sustaining a sovereign nation 
(Gosztonyi, 2016: 180).  
 
Other point of disagreement particularly between President Kiir and vice 
President Riek Machar that have led the spirit of South Sudan’s ruling party 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) into two: SPLM mainstream 
under President Kiir, and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement In 
Opposition (SPLM-IO) under Machar are their approaches on how South 
Sudan should be governed. Kiir favoured a more unitary reorganisation of 
South Sudan, which was to base and maintaining the former 10 existing 
states, while Machar favoured a federal system of government and wanted 
an increase in number of states from 10 to 21. Kiir opposed Machar’s 
approach anchoring that such proposed governance system would 
undermine national unity. However he later made a U-turn following the 
2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South 
Sudan (ARCSS) by hijacking Machar’s federal government system proposal 
and increased the number of states not only from 10 to 21 states as 
previously Machar proposed, but from 10 to 28 states, and later to 32 states. 
This move has been interpreted by the SPLM-IO as a containment strategy 
of its Neur constituency (Aalen, 2019).  
 
These and all other ill implementation of the CPA (Mamdani, 2017a; 
Masabo, 2013), new leaders lack of political will (De Vries and Schomerus, 
2017), and identity and citizenship crisis in South Sudan (see next section) 
poses a stumbling block to Zambakari’s (2015) inclusive political 
community solution for South Sudan.  It is here and from a more refined 
analysis Nyadera (2018) recommends going back to roots and address the 
root causes for war recurrence and failure of various peace deals. This is so 
because, “competition for political power and differing ideologies among 
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local leaders create a scenario where communities regroup within their 
ethnic cocoons in order to advance their cause” (Nyadera, 2018: 69). For 
peace to flourish, addressing all these is cannot be overemphased.  
 
To resolve with factors inhibiting progress in South Sudan and for ending 
conflict recurrence, like De Vries and Schomerus (2017) and Masabo (2013); 
Nyadera (2018) proposes moving beyond Dinka-Nuer binary because such 
framework framing of South Sudan conflicts and problems has been 
responsible for the many failures of the many peace agreement. This is so 
because most of the solutions made, have fallen victims of this framing and 
thus ignoring ethnic animosities and rivalries beyond those of Dinka and 
Nuer. Within the international community such framing have led to 
oversimplification of the conflict in South Sudan (De Vries and Schomerus, 
2017) and as the result “the excessive attention given to the government and 
the opposition in the ongoing civil war has overshadowed genuine 
grievances that ordinary citizens of the country are facing and that can 
motivate them to take up arms and fight” (Nyadera (2018: 75). And because 
of this trend of war recurrences in South Sudan, Nyadera, (2018: 60) 
proposes the establishment of transitional authority as “an exit strategy that 
will ensure the gaps that allowed previous peace agreements to collapse are 
sealed by involving local, regional and international actors.” This is a 
powerful proposition though it also attracts a number of questions such, 
how novel is the proposal, and to what extent does it differ those proposed 
in the CPA and subsequent peace agreements such as the 2015 Agreement 
on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS)? It 
for these and many other unanswered questions this article proposes the 
embracing of human rights, democracy and democratic leadership as a tool 
to help in overcoming the existing tensions and for better organisation of 
the new South Sudan.  
 
However, an observation have to be made, that, although external help and 
support is necessary for South Sudanese in this journey; it is only them who 
can only successfully bring about needed changes and transformation. In 
addition to what has been suggested, South Sudan’s the take-off point for 
peace need to consider self–reflection and self-criticism particularly asking 
themselves the extent to which they have benefited from  last seven or so 
years of instability. It is high time to stop shelving history but also is not 
time to embark of history of warring ethnic groups. Nevertheless, as 
Zambakari (2015) have rightly argued; the way forward ought to be an 
embrace of unity in diversity. Diversity ought to be cerebrated but not as a 
means of identifications and national building. Since they have joined the 
East Africa community, they have good examples. Countries like Tanzania 
have many ethnic groups though not matching in number to those in South 
Sudan, and can provide learning lessons for them as they strive to embrace 
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values of modern states organization. South Sudanese need to remind 
themselves that, democracy as an element of modernity calls for good 
governance, respect of human rights, accountability, and democratic 
ascendancy to power. These echo President Kiir independence speech 
words and calls for revisiting their aspirations and work out their practical 
implementation. The SPLM /SPLM-IO leaders should not overlooked the 
people’s higher expectation of independence gained by the price of blood of 
those who died in wars, hunger, displacement, and all the ramifications the 
fifty years of wars. To move forward  addressing their differences amicably 
and putting people first in all what is done be it the government, leaders or 
ordinary citizens do and by remembering that if they are to embrace the 
eight pillars of peace framework; there are possibilities of having a viable 
community determined to peaceful co-exist not only with itself but also 
with its neighbours. 
 
Nationality challenge: who is and who is not a South Sudanese?  
One of the major impacts of foreign domination in Africa was the 
introduction of categories of recognition (Lund 2016; Mamdani, 2017b; 
2012). They set in motion the need for some of communities to constantly 
struggle for their recognition and access of resources as these newly 
introduced categories created became the major defining principles for 
citizenship, belongingness and provided means for access use of resources 
(Lund, 2016; Marko, 2016; 2015). Moreover, these new categories of 
recognition became among the many causes of the postcolonial wars in 
Africa that have consumed lives of many people and devastated property.  
 
The people of the present South Sudan, are among those who have been 
fighting for recognition as the result of historical crated categories and a 
country where struggle for recognition and access to resources continue to 
destroy property and devour lives of many people (Zambakari, 2015). Like 
it was to many Africa countries and people in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s,  July 2011 South Sudan’s independence most of the South Sudanese 
was expected to be the beginning of new end: the beginning of a new 
country where struggle for identities and access to resources could be left to 
shelved historical books. Their  hoped was that, this hard won 
independence and newly created country could provide a single and 
common identity, by striking balance between history, cultural values, and 
modernity; what Makumba (2007: 110) calls, “African twin-desire: the desire 
on the one hand for cultural personalization and to the other hand for doing 
so in dialogue with modernisation.” 
 
The crisis of citizenship in South Sudan is linked to the history of state 
formation in Sudan (Zambakari, 2015: 73). When the British decided to rule 
it and give it demarcation, the people continued to live under the different 
chiefdoms. It took colonialism to make what we call South Sudan today. In 
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that regard, the national identity of this new country is not automatic, but it 
has to be re-worked-on by inspiring people to regard themselves as one. 
Although some scholars tend to particularise the South Sudan case as a 
country whose “independence came about under unique circumstances that 
differed from those in African countries with fair social, economic and 
education infrastructures” (Nyadera, 2018: 80); with regard to the 
citizenship and identity question it is not unique. As Zambakari (2015: 76) 
points-out, there are similarities between identity and citizenship struggles 
by South Sudanese to those “struggles with the contested nature of 
citizenship and the dual system of native/settler that operate in most 
countries in East Africa.” It is an important struggle they should face as 
many African countries have faced it and some continue to face it.  
 
Some have made significant successes such as Tanzania (Mamdani, 2012) 
but other on continuous reforms such as Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002). 
Nonetheless though is not unique, South Sudan is case which calls for 
devising “a new concept of citizenship that is inclusive of the different 
nationalities within the country as well as those who are coming from 
outside may wish to make South Sudan their homes” (Zambakari, 2015: 76). 
This is necessary if peace is to flourish and forging common identity is to be 
achieved. An understanding that identity formation and making people feel 
as South Sudanese citizens will not come by only identifying demarcations 
that divides them; but rather by twining the common history (colonialism 
and struggles for independence) with the common vision of enjoying the 
country’s resources together is necessary. This is a call to self-denial for the 
sake of South Sudan’s better future.  
 
To make this possible the government has to provide for its people in order 
to make them feel the value of being citizens. People ought to go beyond the 
ethnic binary by embracing a countrywide identity ethic that recognizes 
everyone. South Sudanese and their leaders should know that violence will 
not smash the legacy of colonial created identities, but rather it requires a 
political vision and political organisation. The so-called South Sudanese 
identity will only depend on the legal and administrative apparatus in 
place. They should reckon Mamdani’s (2012: 107) advice in Define and Rule: 
Political as Identity, that envisages the “creation of a substantive law from a 
multiple sources—pre-colonial life, colonial modern form of state and ant-
colonial resistances (for South Sudan this should as well constitute anti-
north resistances)—and establishment of a single and unified law-enforcing 
machinery meant for every citizen.” This is key to resolving their problems. 
More so, they should not undermine the fact that South Sudan is a multi-
diversified society in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion and that 
secession cannot be the answer to their diversity (Hawi, 2014: 41). That is to 
say, South Sudan does not belong to Dinka and Nuer only; and any clashes 
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between them should not translate into a country clash and slain lives of 
innocent citizens. Rather, they should find means to deliberate their 
conflicts amicably considering the interests of other ethnic groups. In 
addition, the major ethnic groups should not translate the vote value of 
secession referendum that gave birth to South Sudan into another form of 
domination. They need to understand the fact that, there will be no leader 
who will not belonging to either ethnic group and that, in itself should not 
be a problem, but only when it is misused and used as a point of 
discriminating others. 
 
Role of governance in the South Sudan’s challenge of national 
building 
Since 1980s and more particularly in 1990s, the term ‘governance’ and 
increasingly ‘good governance’ and ‘bad governance’ have permeated 
development discourse and especially research agendas and other activities 
funded by public and private banks and bilateral donors such as the United 
Nations (UN) and its agencies, the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Weiss, 2000). Nonetheless, the term governance is not new and 
uncontested one. What are probably new and contested are the newly 
coined concepts of ‘good governance’ and ‘bad governance’, which are, 
disputed among scholars and policy experts. Based on Elahi’s (2009: 1167) 
account, the term, ‘good governance’ was first mentioned, causally, in the 
World Bank’s (1989) report: Sub-Sahara Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth – A Long-Term Perspective Study, but the idea crystallized into the 
most popular international development policy project within a decade. 
 
Governance can be defined as a concept as well as a process. As a concept, 
however it has no universal accepted definition, but rather varying 
definitions that tend to have an emphasis on some issues but almost 
depicting the same purposes.  In public administration literature for 
example, it reflects a paradigm shift within the field. To public 
administration pundits, governance paradigm emerged in early 1990s. And 
as Henry (2007: 40) remarks, governance is the results of “1980s…trends 
that connote fundamental change in how we perceived the governments 
and its administration…under the rubrics of globalisation, redefinition and 
devolution and these developments are causing enormous change within 
and among the three sectors―public, private and non-profit.” Within this 
understanding, and as the way Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks (2009: 2) 
conceptualise it, governance has two entirely different purposes. First, it “is 
a means to achieve collective benefits by coordinating human activity.” 
Given the variety of public goods and their varying externalities, efficient 
governance will be multi-leveled. Second, governance is “an expression of 
community. Citizens care passionately about who exercises authority over 
them.” Within the UN, the World Bank and IMF literature, the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) often binds them with term 
Huria Journal vol. 26(2), September, 2019 
The Apparition of the Perceived Enemy 
Conrad John Masabo 
 
 152 
governance to the 1997 most popular definition. In one of its 1997 policy 
documents, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, the UNDP 
defined governance as “the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authorities to manage a country’s affairs at all levels, 
[comprising] mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet 
their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP, 1997:1-2).  
 
In this perspective, governance comprises the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their 
differences (Braathen, Chaligha & Odd-Helge, 2005: 9). As such, “it entails a 
more devolved system of governance as opposed to centralized one, which 
opens door for common people to participate in the governing of their own 
affairs and creating a sense of ownership” (Masabo, 2013: 144). It is in this 
context that governance systems become an imperative aspect of South 
Sudan national building as it can enhance participation and accountability 
that forms amongst many other factors pointed out as the causes of the 
continued wars in this new African republic. 
 
Scholars writing on South Sudan conflicts especially those focusing on the 
period after independence tend to peg governance as a litmus paper test for 
the rebuilding of South Sudan. Radon and Logan (2014: 149) for example, 
posit South Sudan as “a prime example of how governance arrangements 
can either achieve and maintain peace or become the trigger for civil war.” 
Based on this observation, deciding which framework best suit the 
organisation of South Sudan polity is primary for its sustainability; an 
imperative ordering framework that can accommodate challenges coming 
from a country that “is sparsely populated and ethnically, culturally and 
linguistically diverse” (Radon and Logan, 2014:152) such as South Sudan.  
 
In that regard, adoption of a decentralised and federal system of governance 
is not a choice but a must. This is so because “studies have indicated that 
presidential systems are prone to ‘authoritarian collapse’ or ‘democratic 
breakdowns’ than parliamentarianism (Radon and Logan, 2014:156) and the 
experiences of South Sudan so far seem to affirm this view. The challenge, 
like many proposals from other scholars is how this proposed framework 
work-out and which template at had that South Sudanese could re-work on, 
to work-on, adjust to their contexts, and implement to reverse what has 
been going on since independence.   
 
In response, Awolich (2018) dives-in and provides some suggestions on 
how to go about embracing governance in South Sudan. In his policy brief 
for Sudd Institute in Juba, which he titles ‘Fixing Governance is Key to 
Huria Journal vol. 26(2), September, 2019 
The Apparition of the Perceived Enemy 
Conrad John Masabo 
 
153 
Stability in South Sudan’, he identifies major challenges facing the country 
and examine the extent to which the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the 
Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has put governance and 
mechanisms to realise it at its core. Persisting major challenges that Awolich 
(2018) finds are the lack of good governance strategic direction and vision at 
which all the people rally around in forging a national identity. Although 
the R-ARCSS seem to have missed the target, Awolich is still hopeful that, it 
has “set out mandates for the Revitalized Transitional Government of 
National Unity (RTGONU)” (Awolich, 2018:10).  
 
The emphasis these authors make suggests the imperative and power of 
governance in re-organising the ethnic torn South Sudan. It is so because 
governance remains core for peace consolidation while at the same time is 
challenging, since establishing a functioning governance system in war torn 
country is not an easy task. To have it in place, government’s commitment 
to development and citizens’ patience are needed. As such, South Sudan 
reminded to avoid and not imitate the ill examples from other independent 
countries. While there are many African leaders who embraced repressive 
governance systems, as well as siphoning public resources by squandering 
the country’s wealth as individual properties, South Sudan’s leaders should 
avoid that.  
 
They should be aware that, if they do so, it would take them back to war. 
Furthermore, the claim of poor functioning of the incumbent’s government 
and corruption complains (Awolich, 2018; Nyadera, 2018) should be 
worked-on seriously and addressed squarely if the government wants to 
prove its legitimacy. Adoption of decentralized governance is not only a 
bridge to successful nation building, but also a key to empowerment and 
participation. South Sudan should aim at being an exemplary state in Africa 
since it has a lot to learn from the experiences of other countries. It should 
adopt a mode of government that qualifies it as a newly twenty-first-
century created state, as such self-awareness is important to this 
understanding.  
 
Moreover, it is tacit that, the struggle for popular sovereignty is an ongoing 
process and thus South Sudan is not an exception. The popular uprising that 
rocked the North African region beginning with Tunisia and spreading to 
Egypt, Libya and now recently Omar Bashir government in Sudan, others is 
a testimony of how juridical freedom and civil-military relationship is being 
translated by ordinary people into popular freedom (Ndlovu-Gatshen, 2013: 
32). Likewise, for South Sudan leaders they should know that the signal sent 
by the attempted coup should not be underestimated, but rather serve as an 
awakening moment to resolve all the pending questions of power in South 
Sudan.  
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Lastly, South Sudanese ought to be aware that something you cannot do for 
yourself, no one can do it for you. They should be confident and understand 
that, if they made it for territorial self-determination; they should not 
hesitate for political, cultural, and economic self-determination. To forge 
ahead, investment in both economic, political and administrative 
infrastructure and human resources is paramount. South Sudan should 
provide progressive and liberating education to its citizens to empower 
them to stand for the development of their country by avoiding producing 
westernized graduates who are alienated from South Sudan, African society 
and its African values.  
 
Conclusion 
Although South Sudan still faces many challenges, it still hold hope for 
making it a better place for the millions of population. The challenges that it 
faces particularly the historical one of state formation or what Lund (2016) 
calls ‘production of property and citizenship’ needs fresh answers. One of 
the ways to address and answer the many dilemmas highlighted within this 
article is by challenging what Marko (2015) call ‘ethnic turn’ which entails 
the return to the colonial categorization and classification of people 
according to ethnicity; which has become central to South Sudan citizenship 
production process. Given the many dynamics of state formation processes 
in the country, there is a need of addressing some key issues. Among those 
key issues are that the country is faced with is the formidable challenge of 
recognition and access to resources. Thus, addressing issues of recognition 
and national identity creation is one of the stepping-stones towards 
sustainable peace in South Sudan. The international community ought to 
continue offering help to South Sudan in demilitarization, especially by 
collecting the small arms that are easily available in country. Furthermore, 
working on what the AUCISS (2014) report proposed and the ongoing 
African Union initiatives to normalize the peaceful condition in the country, 
have to be worked out to re-awaken the hope of life in newly born and the 
youngest African country—Republic of South Sudan.  
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